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During  the  last  five  years,  some  key  changes
have  occurred  in  our  political  economy  which  ap-
pear  to  have influenced  the structure  and behavior
of our  economy  and have  had a  particular  impact
on  the  U.S.  food  industry.  I  would  like  to share
with  you  today  some  tentative  thoughts  con-
cerning  a few  of these key  influences  which  seem
to  be changing the character  of the food  industry's
organization, conduct,  and performance.1
In  a  comprehensive  discussion  of  this  broad
topic,  one  would  want  to  document  carefully
some  recent  structural  changes  (e.g.  changes  in
concentration,  entry  barriers,  influence  of  multi-
nationals  and  conglomerates,  amount  of  vertical
integration,  etc.)  and  consider  many  structural
and  behavioral  issues  (including  the  influence  of
advertising,  private  labels,  cooperatives,  new
product  research  and  development,  patents,  etc.).
Most  contributions  to  industrial  organization
literature  concentrate  on the  relationship  between
structure-conduct-performance,  and  place  less
emphasis  on  the  interaction  among those variables
and  basic  environmental  influences.  Therefore,
I have  elected  to  discuss  some  key  environmental
changes  which  I  hypothesize  are  important
influences  on  overall  food  industry  organization
and behavior,  today and in the future.
Although  there  is  some  sketchy  evidence
available,  I  have  not  attempted  any  careful  or
conclusive  documentation,  nor  do  I  think  that
all  the  data required  would  be available  to achieve
that  purpose.  Rather,  these  observations  should
be  considered  behavioral  hypotheses  which  may
provide  some  insights  into  the  changing  motiva-
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1Scherer  described  these  as  the  "basic  conditions"
which  influence  market  structure  and  conduct  in  his
basic  conditions-market  structure-conduct-performance
paradigm  [2,  pp. 5-61.
tion  structure  and  resulting  organization  and
behavior  within  the  food industry  and  the  rest of
our  economy.  After  suggesting  a  few  possible
implications  of  these  hypotheses,  I  would  like
to  consider  briefly  the  reasons  for  heightened
interest  in  vertical  coordination  within  the  food
industry  before  suggesting  a  few  research  topics
which might be professionally intriguing.
World Interdependence
In  recent  years,  it  has  become  obvious  that
the  economies  of  the  world  have  become  in-
creasingly  interdependent.  Advances  in  communi-
cation  technology  are  not  the  only  contributor
to  increasing  awareness  and  interaction  in  the
political,  social,  and  economic  spheres  of activity.
World  economies  also  are  becoming  more  closely
linked  as  a  result  of  some  trade  barriers  easing
(e.g.  China,  U.S.S.R.).  Agricultural  commodity
markets  in  the  United  States,  for  example,  now
surge  and  fall  quite  responsively  to  abnormal
weather  developments  in  major  producing  areas
anywhere  in  the  world.  Thus,  a production  prob-
lem  in  one  area  is  felt  in other  economies  which
are not  "insulated"  from  those variations  through
protective  internal  policies.  In  fact,  those  areas
of  the  world  which  are  less  "insulated",  like  the
United  States,  undoubtedly  bear  more  of  the
benefits  or  brunt  of  the  adjustments  required,
compared  with  those  that  are  more  "insulated,"
like  the  European  Economic  Community.  Also,
with  the  onset  of  "floating"  currencies,  the
ebbs  and  flows  in  the  economies  of  the  world
are  now  more  quickly  and  directly  transmitted
into  changes  in  trade  flows  and  corresponding
economic activity  in many other countries.
Among  the many implications of this increasing
interdependence  of world economies  is  one which
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I  would  emphasize:  the  occasional  contribution
to  increased  volatility  in  our  economy,  and  the
related  risk  and  uncertainty  in  the  management
and  resource  allocation  decisions  within  the
domestic  food  industry.  Students  of  economics
might  also  note  that  this  stimulates  both govern-
ment  and industry demand for improved  economic
and  market  intelligence  and  its  interpretation  so
that  they  may  operate  effectively  within  this
more  volatile and risky  environment.
The Impact of Shortages
It  has  been  the  food  industry's  experience
during  the  last  several  years  that  raw  materials
shortages  have  often  cropped  up  unexpectedly.
Certainly,  some  of  the  weather  adversities  which
have  been  evident  in major  producing  countries-
in  the  U.S.S.R.,  China,  India,  Western  Europe,
and  the  U.S.-have  contributed  dramatically  to
the  sharp  swings  in  prices  for  the  major  grains
and  oilseeds,  for  sugar  (particularly  in  1974-75),
and  currently,  for  green  coffee.  These  have  con-
tributed  importantly  to  price  inflation  in  many
countries,  to  food  shortages  (particularly  in
some  less  developed  countries),  and  to  sharp
adjustments  in  the  livestock  sectors  of  the
developed  economies  most  affected  (particularly
the  U.S. in  1974-75, and  the U.S.S.R. in 1975-76).
Perhaps  the  most dramatic  shock  to many  eco-
nomies  in  the last  few years  was  the  energy crisis,
prompted  by  the  OPEC  oil  embargo.  Not  only
did  this  cause  a  significant  shift  in  prices  in  its
aftermath, but it also created  some severe shortages
of raw  materials  in  many phases  of our  economy
as  fuel was  allocated  by  government  regulation  to
"priority"  users.  Undoubtedly,  the  overheated
economy in  1973 contributed  to a surge of demand
which  added  to  the  backlog  of  orders,  but other
factors  were  also  primary  contributors  to  some
short-term  shortages  which  have  been experienced
in  the  last several  years.  The  shortage  of fuel and
petrochemicals  was  compounded  by  the  wage and
price  controls  still  in  effect  in  1974;  companies
unable  to  get  as much  fuel  or  other  raw materials
as  they  would  like  naturally  had  a  tendency  to
allocate  the  scarce  input  to  the  most  profitable
production  alternative,  and  that  most  profitable
alternative  under  the  structure  of  the  wage  and
price  control  regulations  was  not  necessarily  the
item  currently  in  the  greatest  demand  by  their
customers.  As  a  consequence,  some  artificial
shortages  were  created  which  caused  a  lot  of
scrambling  for  substitute  raw  materials.  This
sometimes led,  in turn, to other shortages.
Recession  and "Liquidity Crunch"
Emerging  from  a  fairly long period of sustained
economic  growth  without  severe  interruptions  in
the  1960s  the  roller  coaster  economy  which  we
have  observed  thus  far  in  the  '70s  may have  had
a  significant  impact (at  least  short  term)  on  the
structure  and  behavioral  motivations  within  the
food industry.
As  the  inflationary  spiral circled  even higher in
1974  from  the  combined  impact  of inflationary
expectations  fueling  increased  demand  in  the
economy,  the energy  crisis, and the adverse weather
in  the  mid-western  corn  belt,  real  domestic  con-
sumer  demand  weakened  significantly  as  we  slid
into  the  most  severe  worldwide  recession  in
several  decades.  At the  same time, money demand
for capital  projects  was  still  quite  high,  as was  the
operating  capital  required  to finance  the  spiraling
value  of inventories  in all  sectors  of the economy.
Combined  with  the  tight  money  policy  of  the
Federal  Reserve  at  that  time,  this  precipitated  a
short, but severe  liquidity crunch in the economy.
Many  firms  were  scrambling  to stay afloat  as cash
requirements  to  operate  their  businesses  were
increasing,  but  cash inflows  were  sharply  reduced
due  to  the  recession,  and  money  seemed  to  be
available  only  to  those  firms  who  were  so  finan-
cially solid  that they didn't really need it.
Many  marginal  firms  (mostly  small,  but  a  few
large  ones)  entered  bankruptcy  or  were  rescued
from  a  precarious  position  through  merger  or
acquisition  by more financially  secure firms.  Those
firms  which  did not "go  under"  during  1974  and
early  1975  gained  a  sharply  increased  awareness
of the  need  for  cash  self-sufficiency  in their enter-
prises.  At  the  same  time,  the  spiraling  inflation
rate  spurred  management's  sensitivity  to  the  in-
creasing  cost of replacing  or increasing plant  capa-
city  in  those  enterprises  where  capacity  shortfalls
had been  recently  encountered,  or where the future
demand  outlook  was  quite  rosy.  Perhaps  this  was
why price-cutting  was not in vogue,  as was the  case
in  earlier  recessions,  even  though  the  1974-1975
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severe  recession  led  to  operating  capacities  less
than  70% of capacity  in several major manufactur-
ing industries. Rather, maintenance  of margins and
internal  cash  flow  probably  became  much  more
important  objectives of those managers who could
not  acquire  capital  from  the  outside,  and  who
would  have  to  meet  stringent  profit  targets  on
future  plant  and  equipment  proposals  which
would  be  based  upon  rapidly increasing  "replace-
ment"  or "expansion"  costs. The recent Securities
and  Exchange  Commission  requirement  that
replacement  cost  be  used  as  a  basis  for  financial
reports  will  undoubtedly  stimulate  even  more
management  attention  to  inflation  in  its  pricing
and investment decisions  in the  future.
When  data for  the  last five years becomes  avail-
able,  I  would  wager  that  it  will  show  that  the
economic  structure  in  the  food  industry  has
become  slightly  more  concentrated,  not so  much
by  the  largest  firms  (which  are  effectively  con-
strained  from  horizontal  merger),  but  primarily
through  the  internal  growth  of  "medium-sized"
firms,  or their acquisition  of smaller firms, and the
elimination  of some  marginal  firms. Since  a severe
recession  often  forces  a  corporation to re-evaluate
whether  it  is  recession-proof  or  recession-prone,
many  larger  corporations  may  be  motivated  to
diversify  into  other  markets  via  acquisition  or
development  of their  own  new  businesses.  Thus,
concentration  statistics  may  continue  to  show  a
slight  increase;  however,  the  competitive  environ-
ment  may  be  even  tougher  as  the  smaller  firms
grow,  enhance  their  input  and  product  market
competitive  ability,  and  become  more  viable  in
the long run.
Policy  Developments
During  the  last  few  years,  a  combination  of
unexpected  policy  developments  and  regulatory
actions  has  led  to  definite  changes  in  the  per-
ceived  risk  and  uncertainty  by  the  "actors"
in  our  continually  unfolding  economic  drama.
Governmental  commodity  policy  (combined  with
some  bad  Russian  weather)  led  to  an  elimination
of  Commodity  Credit  Corporation  grain  stock-
piles  in  the  early  '70s.  Current  commodity  price
policy  for  the  major  grains  has  freed  up  grain
prices  from  the  tight  shackles  previously  imposed
by  large  stocks  and  "high"  price  support  levels.
As a consequence, prices are much more susceptible
to substantial  swings,  as we've observed during the
last few years when record price  volatility has been
experienced  in many commodities.
Within  the  last  five years,  public  pressures have
led  to the  instigation  of wage  and  price  controls,
in  an  effort  to  dampen  the  inflation  rate  in  an
overheated  economy,  and  to  export  controls,
to  take  the  heat  off  fiery  commodity  markets
and  the  public's  concern  about  the  adequacy  of
domestic  supplies  and  sharply  inflated  domestic
price  levels.  While  some  worries  were  alleviated
by  these  controls,  some  resource  misallocation
also  resulted,  and  some  perceived  risks  were
definitely increased.
For  example,  I'm  sure  that  the  reliability  of
the U.S.  as an export supplier of basic commodities
has  been diminished sharply  in the eyes of some of
our export  customers.  Similarly,  I have  no doubt
that  wage  and  price  controls  had  a  carryover
impact  for quite  some  time  on  subsequent  pricing
decisions  in many  major  U.S. industries.  However,
I'm  certain  that  some  consumers  and  industry
participants  feel  that  there  has  been  a  positive
political  response  to  the  problems  that  they
voiced  even  though  the  policies  were  sometimes
too  little,  too  late-or  possibly  aggravated  the
situation later.
In the area of regulatory  actions, Food and Drug
regulations  have  been  playing  a  more  important
role  in the  food industry in  recent years,  as better
testing  methods  combined  with  the  extremely
stringent  restrictions  imposed  by  the  Delaney
Amendment make  old or new products much more
susceptible  to  an  unexpected  problem  developing,
and  therefore,  much  more  costly  and  risky  to
develop.  This  probably  discourages  new  product
development  and  potential  product  competition
to  some  extent,  and  can  increase  consumer  costs
on products which ultimately prove successful.
Theoretically,  this  should  lead  to reduced  risk
to  consumers  as the law intends,  but the attendant
influence  on  industry  structure,  conduct,  and
performance  may  lead  instead  to  consumer  costs
outweighing benefits.  While any questions involving
the  risk  to  human  life  are  extremely  difficult  to
resolve,  the  benefit/cost  dimensions  of alternative
FDA  regulations  should  be  a  fruitful  area  for
economists  to  delve  into  to  determine  whether
changes in  policy  guidelines might be  in the public
interest.
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Another area  of regulatory  activity  that  I want
to mention  is  anti-trust  legislation  and  regulation.
As  new  ground  is  being  broken  by  the  Federal
Trade  Commission,  the  Department  of  Justice,
the  courts,  and  the  Congress;  uncertainty  in-
creases  concerning  acceptable  economic structure
and  behavior  and  corresponding  legal  overhead
costs  in  operating  a  business.  In  addition  to the
pending  anti-trust legislation in the Congress,  there
is  some  new  ground  being  tested  by  the  Federal
Trade  Commission  staff.  Let  me  quote  part  of a
Newsweek  article  on  the  theory  underlying  the
"cereal case"  which is currently  being tried:
In  judging  anti-trust  cases,  U.S.  Courts  have
generally  insisted  that Adam  Smith's  suspicions be
backed  by  hard evidence of conspiracy  before they
would  hand  down  convictions  for  price  fixing  or
restraint  of  trade.  But  now  in  a  massive  monoply
suit  being  tried  against  the  four  biggest  cereal
companies,  the Federal Trade  Commission is testing
out  a  new  legal  theory.  . . the concept  of 'shared
monopoly'-an  economist's  theory  that  in  some
industries,  a  handful  of firms can control the lion's
share of the  market without  any overt conspiracy.
If upheld,  it  could  set a staggering precedent,  since
the  FTC  believes  such  concentration  exists  in
many  key  industries,  from autos to steel.  [1,  p.79]
While  the  policy  developments  and  regulatory
actions  which  I  have  mentioned  have  obviously
reduced  risks  in  some  segments  of  our  economy
and  eliminated  some  uncertainties,  I  believe  that
the  overall  economic environment  would probably
be  characterized  by  some  food  industry  members
as  more  uncertain  today  than five  years  ago,  with
potentially  greater  price,  supply,  and  policy
instability.  Further,  I'm  sure  that  some  of  the
shocks  which  have  come  from  unexpected  direc-
tions  in the  last several  years  have made  investors
and  management  in  the  food industry  much more
wary.  My  hypothesis  is  that  there  are  larger  risk
premiums being built into product pricing decisions,
new  plant  and  equipment  investment  decisions,
and  increased  motivation  to  transfer  or eliminate
some  of those increased  risks where feasible.
For instance,  the increased volumes in commodity
futures  markets  will  attest  to  the  increased  com-
mercial  (and speculative)  business  being done util-
izing  futures  markets.  However,  those  contracts
being  traded  quite  openly  in  centralized  markets
probably  are  only the visible  tip of an ever-growing
iceberg.  Firms in  the  food  industry  appear much
more  receptive  to a variety  of new vertical coordi-
nation  innovations  or  applications,  especially  in
those areas where  they have seen problems crop up
in recent years,  and where they feel complete verti-
cal integration would not be feasible or sufficiently
profitable.
There  are  a variety  of reasons  why  a firm  may
wish  to  contract  for  goods  or  services  for an  ex-
tended  period,  and  shift  or  eliminate  some  risk
elements in its business environment.  For example,
if a company  is financially weak, it may be able to
acquire  capital  for  maintaining  or  expanding  its
business  operations,  and  a  signed  long-term  sales
contract  with a  financially  responsible customer is
an  excellent  vehicle  to  acquire  credit  which may
not  otherwise  be  available.  On  the  other hand,  a
customer  concerned  about  the  potential  avail-
ability  or  possible  price  inflation  in  a  strategic
supply  industry  may  be  quite  willing to contract
for his estimated requirements at a cost considered
reasonable,  given  the  security  of  supply  insured
by the contact.
In  production/processing/distribution  systems
where  tight  product  specifications  are  quite
important  to  one  or more  phases  of  the  system,
long-term  contracts  can  often  stimulate  better
quality  control  through  more  coordinated  and
reliable  scheduling,  or  through  tailoring  the
processing  equipment  or  product  selection  to the
unusual  requirements  of the customer.  In addition
to providing a vehicle for improving communication
and  increasing  responsiveness  to changing  supplier
and customer  needs, there can be joint operational
efficiencies  achieved  through  sales/procurement
cost  reductions,  increased  stability  in  operating
and  accounting  procedures,  and  reduced  costs
resulting from such standardization.
Vertical Coordination
Greater  uncertainty  and  instability  in the  food
subsector  of  our  economy  has  greatly  increased
the  interest  of  industry  participants  in  a  variety
of vertical coordination innovations or applications.
A Sweetner  Industry Example
The  attractiveness  of coordination  innovations
obviously  varies  widely  according  to  the  individ-
ual  market environment,  and the magnitude  of the
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"problems"  perceived  by industry  participants.  A
prime  example  of an  industry  which has  become
more  receptive  to such innovations  recently  is the
sweetener industry.  Due to a)  the supply  of sugar
becoming  quite  scarce  in  1974,  b)  price  increases
of  more  than  600%  for  a  brief  period  of time,
followed  by  c)  a  sharp  price  decline  leading  to
sharp  fluctuations  in  export  earnings  for  major
producing  countries,  and  compounded  by  d)
the  large  influx  of  new  corn  sweetener  capacity
prompted  by  extremely  high  profit  levels  during
the  sugar  price  surge  as  well  as the  technological
innovation  of  the  sweeter  high  fructose  corn
syrup,  and  e)  the  elimination  of  the  highly
protective  domestic  sugar  legislation,  the
sweetener  industry  might  reasonably  have  been
expected  to  be  a  prime  candidate  for  structural
and  behavioral  change.  And  it was.  Without  going
into  details,  let  me  merely  list  a  few  recent
developments in the sweetener  industry:
a)  Long-term  "participating"  contracts  between
U.S.  sugar  refiners  and  the Philipine  government,
and  long-term  supply  contracts  between  U.S.
refiners  and Dominican Republic producers.2
b)  Much  more  futures  market  participation  by
domestic sugar users and domestic sugar producers.
c)  Acquisition  of  a  corn  sweetener  producer  by
the largest U.S. sugar refiner,  Amstar.
d) Acquisition  of  a  corn  sweetener  producer  by
Heinz, a major  food company.
e)  A  joint  venture  by  Miles  Laboratory  and
Cargill,  placing  a  corn  sweetener  plant  next  to  a
citric  acid  plant  (which  uses  corn  sweeteners  as
an input).
I'm  sure  that there  are  a variety  of other  long-
term  arrangements  which have evolved in the sugar
and corn sweetener industries which assure  volume,
price,  or some combination. Certainly, this industry
has been  a fertile ground for new vertical coordina-
tion and integration  efforts,  as  the convergence  of
several  environmental  changes  has  led  to  poten-
tially  significant  structural  and  behavioral  changes
in an important subsector of our food industry.
2In  participating  contracts,  the  producer  price  will
be related to the  selling price of the refiner.
Some  of the  same  environmental  factors  are
present  in  many  other  subsectors  of  the  food
industry.  I  would  hypothesize  that  there  is  an
increasing  awareness  and  receptivity  to  coordina-
tion  innovations  which  shift  or  eliminate  risk.
While  the motivation  may be  less  strong,  I'm sure
that the status quo is continually being reexamined.
However,  the  extent  or  degree  of  coordination
innovations undertaken  in any part of the industry
also  has  its  limits.  By  eliminating  or  shifting one
risk  element,  another  risk  is  sometimes  created.
For example,  while you may  be  able  to guarantee
a volume  bought or  sold  or  a price,  a firm may be
exposing  itself  to  an  opportunity  loss  or  a
potential  competitive  disadvantage  if  prices  drop
below  the  price  established,  the  risk  of  being
unable  to  deliver  or  use  the  volumes  specified
(and  the  corresponding  penalties  involved),  or
the  risk  of  a  future  competitive  disadvantage  if
other supply sources or sales outlets are lost due to
the long-term contract with someone else.
Research Issues
Obviously,  a  key  prerequisite  for any  of these
research issues is keeping abreast of and  document-
ing  the key  changes  in  the  economic  environment
and corresponding structural  and behavioral change
in  the  food  industry.  I  would  propose  that  the
market  structure  of  the  food  industry  is both  an
effect  and  a  cause.  The  relationships  between
structure,  conduct,  and  performance  hypothe-
sized  as  causal  relationships  by  industrial  organi-
zation  theorists have some validity in my thinking,
yet  I  feel  that  we  do  not  know  enough  about
the  complex  of  horizontal  and  vertical  relation-
ships  within many  subsectors  of the food industry
to fully  validate  the  conventional  theory (or alter-
nate  hypotheses).  At  the  same  time,  we  need  a
better understanding  of the  dynamics of structural
change,  the  environmental  factors  conditioning
such  behavior,  the  internal  investor  and  manage-
ment  motivations  and  behavior  which  further
contribute  to  structural  change  in  the  industry.
In  essence,  we  need  to  determine  more  precisely
what  stimulates  the  changing  structure  and
behavior  in  the  food industry,  and better analyze
the  performance  and policy implications.
As  new  vertical  coordination  innovations  are
developed  or  applied  in  new  market  areas,  there
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is  a  definite need  to analyse  the  pros and cons for
both  the  buyer  and  seller,  other  competitors,
and  the  overall  subsector equity  and performance
implications.  In  so  doing,  economists  may stimu-
late  greater  industry  awareness  of  the  potential
benefits  and pitfalls involved in such arrangements,
and  point out  some  of the broader advantages  and
disadvantages which would befall other participants
in the subsector.
With  greater  uncertainty  and  instability in  the
economy  and  market in which food industry firms
operate,  the  increasing  importance  of  accurate,
timely  information  in imperfect  markets  prompts
me to suggest  that  this often overlooked aspect  of
market structure needs more emphasis in industrial
organization  and  marketing  research  in  the  food
industry.  Improved  market  information  not  only
improves  the  long-range  resource  allocation
decisions  in  the  industry,  but  also  can  provide  a
substantial  competitive  advantage  to  firms  which
both  acquire  and  act  on  timely  information  in
highly  volatile  markets. Depending  upon  the  type
of  use  to  which  that  advantage  is  put,  significant
change  in  industry  behavior  and  structure  can
result.  At  the  same  time,  this  suggests  that  the
derived  industry  demand  for  economists  capable
of  acquiring  and  interpreting  improved  market
information  has  been  increasing.  In  my  crystal
ball,  I  see  stable  or  increasing  demand  in  the
future  for  economists  with  that  training  and
background.  Thus,  this  research  area  may  be
fruitful  both  as  an  academic  area  of study,  and
as  an  area  of  application  for  those  who  become
skilled in economic  and market analysis.
Since the  "shared monopoly"  concept proposed
as  a  possible  legal precedent  by  the  Federal Trade
Commission  staff  could,  if  upheld,  result  in  a
radical  change  in  the  ultimate  economic  struc-
ture  of  many  industries  in the  United  States,  the
economics  profession  should  probably  re-examine
very  carefully  the  empirical  evidence  related  to
that  theory.  What  is  the  threshold  beyond  which
market  concentration  should  not  be  permitted?
Under  what allied  conditions?  What  would  be  the
probability  and  economic  consequences  of  type
one  and  type  two  errors  which  might  result
from such  a decision rule?
Economic  analyses  and  long-term  forecasts
are  becoming  more  important  inputs  into  the
strategic  planning  process  in  the  food  industry.
With  increasing  environmental  volatility,  larger
gains  or  losses  from  management  decisions  are
possible.  As  a  consequence,  there  should  be
increased  public  and  private  benefits  from  econ-
omic research which contributes to the elimination
of  some  uncertainties  regarding  the  future  world
food  situation,  the  overall  economic environment,
and  associated  government  policy. By contributing
to  improving  the  economic  intelligence  required
for  effective  long-term  industry  planning,  and  by
eliminating  some  of the myths and preconceptions
which  might  otherwise  lead  to  misallocation  of
resources,  improved  food  industry  performance
should result.
Summary
I  have  offered  a  few  tentative  hypotheses
concerning the recent environmental changes which
may  have  prompted  change  in the  structure,  con-
duct,  and  performance  in  the  food  industry.  In
particular,  I have  suggested  that  the  environment
probably  has  become  more  uncertain  and  risky
in the view of many industry participants, and that
industry  behavior  and  structural  change  have
been  and  will  continue  to be  conditioned  by  that
environment.  As  analysts  of food  industry  organi-
zation  and  behavior,  we  need  to  gain  a  better
understanding  of the"outside"  stimuli  which con-
dition  industry  behavior,  and  the  resulting
dynamics  of  industry  structure,  conduct  and
performance.
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